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PLEADING AND THE DILEMMAS OF  
“GENERAL RULES” 
STEPHEN B. BURBANK∗ 
 
     This Paper comments on Professor Geoffrey Miller’s paper on 
pleading under Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. and goes on 
(1) to use Tellabs, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and Iqbal v. Hasty (in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States has granted review) to 
illustrate the limits of, and costs created by, certain foundational 
assumptions and operating principles that are associated with the Rules 
Enabling Act’s requirement of “general rules”; and (2), more generally, to 
illustrate the costs of the complex procedural system that we have created. 
Thus, for instance, the argument that the standards emerging from 
Twombly should be confined to antitrust conspiracy cases confronts the 
foundational assumptions that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
transsubstantive and that they cannot be amended by judicial interpretation. 
Similarly, in Iqbal, the government presumably denies that it is calling for 
the imposition of a heightened fact-pleading requirement in cases involving 
high government officials entitled to an immunity defense because the Court 
seems to have made it impossible for the judiciary openly to impose such a 
requirement other than through “The Enabling Act Process.” The Court 
may, however, take a different view of the appropriate contextual 
plausibility judgment than did the lower court in Iqbal. If so, however, the 
Court would thereby confirm the view that Twombly is an invitation to the 
lower courts to make ad hoc decisions reflecting buried policy choices. I 
therefore argue that, if the Court is persuaded that the changes already 
made to pleading jurisprudence are insufficient to accommodate the needs 
of the immunity defense, it should forthrightly require fact pleading as a 
matter of substantive federal common law. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Professor Geoffrey Miller’s paper on pleading under the Private 
 
 ∗  David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of 
Pennsylvania. Steve Subrin and Tobias Wolff provided helpful comments on a draft, 
and I benefited from discussion of this work at faculty workshops at Penn Law and the 
University of Arizona. Michael O’Connor, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
(Class of 2009), provided excellent research assistance. 
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) after Tellabs, Inc. 
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.1 is both interesting and useful, and I 
agree with almost all of it.2 In this contribution to the Symposium, I 
will first discuss the few matters about which Professor Miller and I 
apparently disagree. I will then use the occasion of commenting on 
Miller’s paper as an opportunity to attach a large tail to a small dog by 
turning to the broader landscape of pleading, and arguing that Tellabs, 
another recent pleading decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,3 and a case soon to be decided, 
Iqbal v. Hasty,4 illustrate costs of, and constraints imposed by, some of 
the foundational assumptions and operating principles of modern 
American procedure. 
 The foundational assumptions I discuss are the notions that (1) the 
“general rules” required by the 1934 Rules Enabling Act5 should not 
only be uniformly applicable in all federal district courts, but uniformly 
applicable in all types of cases (transsubstantive); (2) judicial discretion 
should be preferred to formalism in the creation of such general rules; 
and (3) once made through “The Enabling Act Process,” these general 
rules can only be changed through that process (or by legislation). 
The operating principles I discuss are (1) the view that general 
rules should not only be transsubstantive but also, as it were, 
transprocedural, and accordingly that different rules should not 
(usually) be written for cases having different procedural needs; and (2) 
the view that has translated the preference for judicial discretion into a 
preference for judicial power, resulting in the position that legislative 
procedure is illegitimate. 
The PSLRA’s ambiguities explored by Professor Miller 
resulted from a democratic process that is acknowledged as appropriate 
for the creation of policy on important social issues, such as the issues 
that are implicated when a system chooses pleading rules. Whether or 
not the choices in the provision considered in Tellabs are wise, they are 
 
 1. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
 2. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 507. 
 3. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
 4. 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008). 
 5.  Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. As currently 
codified, the relevant language is:  
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States 
district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts 
of appeals. 
 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
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confined to cases brought under the PSLRA. And if the policy choices 
it reflects are buried, the concern is democratic accountability in the 
weak sense of law makers taking responsibility for their actions.  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) at 
issue in Twombly, by contrast, resulted from a process that is not 
acknowledged as appropriate for the creation of policy on important 
social issues. If the policy choices they make are buried, the concern 
may be democratic accountability in both the weak sense and in the 
strong sense of separation of powers. 
The argument (made by some lower courts and scholars) that 
the standards emerging from Twombly should, and can, be confined to 
antitrust conspiracy cases confronts the foundational assumptions that 
the Federal Rules are transsubstantive and cannot be amended by 
judicial interpretation. Moreover—taking the view that those standards 
do, in fact, represent a change through judicial interpretation—the 
Supreme Court acting as such under Article III of the United States 
Constitution is ill equipped to gather the range of empirical data, and 
lacks the practical experience, that should be brought to bear on the 
questions of policy, procedural and substantive, that are implicated in 
considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings, even in the 
antitrust context. Individual litigation under Article III is even more 
obviously inadequate for the policy choices implicated in considering 
standards for the adequacy of pleadings on a transsubstantive basis.  
The Court has an opportunity to clarify the meaning and scope 
of its Twombly standards in Iqbal, but it is difficult to imagine what the 
Court could do, other than affirm, without exacerbating confusion 
about pleading standards. Yet, both the facts that the Court granted 
certiorari and that Iqbal involves pleading’s interplay with the federal 
common law of official immunity prompt concern that reversal is 
likely. The question becomes how that could be accomplished with 
minimum collateral damage. I argue that, if the Court is persuaded that 
the changes already made to pleading jurisprudence are insufficient to 
accommodate the needs of the immunity defense, it should forthrightly 
require fact pleading as a matter of substantive federal common law. 
These three cases thus illustrate the limits of, and costs created 
by, foundational assumptions and operating principles imputed to, or 
entailed in, the concept of general rules. I conclude with reflections 
about one particular aspect of modern American procedure that has 
always seemed to me perhaps the most serious such cost: its 
complexity.  
It is well and good to defend a choice of judicial discretion over 
formalism as the price of procedural justice. That argument is not 
available, however, for the defense of the operating principle that 
refuses to contemplate separate general rules for simple cases. One 
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might regard that choice as akin to the amount-in-controversy 
requirement in the diversity statute, a necessary defense against the 
consumption of a scarce resource by everyday cases of no importance. 
The comparison does not work, in part because the cases in question by 
hypothesis meet any jurisdictional requirement, and more importantly 
because the argument reflects a buried policy choice afflicted with 
defects in democratic accountability. Moreover, awareness that many 
states have followed the model of the Federal Rules suggests that the 
ultimate cost of crafting the general rules for complex cases may be 
closing this country’s courts to those with everyday disputes.  
I. ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF COMPLAINTS ALLEGING SCIENTER 
AFTER TELLABS: TWO TESTS OR ONE? 
Professor Miller’s analysis of the proper approach to assessing the 
adequacy of securities-fraud complaints after Tellabs is rigorous and 
sophisticated, and what he has to say is illuminating even if one 
disagrees, as I do, with the analytical architecture that he attributes to 
the Court. The statutory language in question provides that “the 
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate 
this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind 
[scienter].”6 The Tellabs Court’s interpretation of strong inference was 
that “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or 
reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference.”7 
I join Professor Miller in rejecting any interpretation of the Court’s 
opinion that would give trumping force to a cogency requirement by 
interpreting it as more demanding than “the requirement of comparative 
inferential strength,”8 although Miller acknowledges that Judge Richard 
Posner’s opinion on remand in Tellabs 9 need not be read to do that.10 
My disagreement concerns the anterior question whether the Court in 
fact intended to prescribe two tests for the adequacy of the 
particularized pleadings on scienter that the PSLRA requires. Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion is hardly a model of precision or 
consistency in the use of language. On the view I take of it, that 
 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 7. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504–05 
(2007). 
 8. Miller, supra note 2, at 511. 
 9. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 10. Miller, supra note 2, at 514 n.18. 
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opinion well illustrates what lexicographer H. W. Fowler called 
“elegant variation,” a vice of those “intent rather on expressing 
themselves prettily than on conveying their meaning clearly.”11 For it 
appears to me that the Court regards the adjective cogent as a synonym 
of strong (the word used in the PSLRA), and also of compelling. In 
other words, “cogent and at least as compelling as any plausible 
opposing inference”12 is an example of lawyers’ penchant not just for 
“elegant variation” but for elegant redundancy, akin to “arbitrary and 
capricious.” 
The Court tells us that one cannot determine whether an inference 
is strong without comparing it to other inferences.13 Since “strong 
inference” is the statutory standard, this raises the question why a 
comparative inquiry alone is not sufficient. If the inference of scienter 
emerging from that inquiry is at least as strong (or compelling) as any 
inference of nonscienter, then it is a strong inference as required by the 
PSLRA. Judge Posner, who may have led Professor Miller down a path 
to nowhere, acknowledged, “It is easier to consider the second, the 
comparative, question first.”14 Indeed it is, because if (1) cogent means 
strong, and (2) whether an inference is strong can only be determined 
through a comparative exercise, answering the second question will 
always answer the first. 
Unlike Professor Miller, in other words, I do not believe that the 
Court intended by the use of cogent to establish a baseline of 
plausibility that an inference of scienter must meet in order to meet the 
Tellabs standard.15 To be sure, Miller has been able to imagine a 
situation in which an inference that qualified as strong under the 
Court’s required comparative analysis might not be deemed plausible 
under a particular view of what plausibility requires, because, although 
as strong as any competing inference, it is not “strong compared with 
the competing inferences taken together.”16 At the least, however, 
bringing plausibility on to the stage for this purpose is unfortunate 
because, in rejecting the view that the PSLRA requires only a plausible 
inference of scienter, the Court equated plausible with reasonable.17 
Further, it is difficult to square Miller’s advocacy of two tests with the 
 
 11. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 130 (1926). 
 12. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 13. See id. at 2510 (“The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a 
vacuum. The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it that one conclusion, as 
compared to others, follows from the underlying facts?”). 
 14. Makor, 513 F.3d at 707. 
 15. Miller, supra note 2, at 514. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504–05 (“[A]n inference of scienter must be 
more than merely plausible or reasonable . . . .”). 
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view (which I share) that “[t]he proper test, in the majority’s view, is 
that the plaintiff wins in the event the competing inferences are equally 
strong.”18 
Miller describes his putative discrete cogency requirement as 
“much less complex,” and, contrary to Judge Posner on remand in 
Tellabs,19 urges courts to address it “before investigating comparative 
inferential strength.”20 In truth, he is advocating two comparative 
exercises. For, as Judge Posner observed, “The plausibility of an 
explanation depends on the plausibility of the alternative 
explanations.”21 Miller admits as much when he states, “The court 
merely needs to evaluate the strength of a single inference—that of 
scienter—and to compare this against an absolute baseline of inferential 
strength.”22 Even if the two comparative exercises Miller imputes to 
Tellabs are not doomed to redundancy, his survey of the content that 
could be given to such an absolute baseline is likely to inspire fear and 
loathing in anyone who understands the threat that legal indeterminacy 
about the freedom of judges to police inferences presents to policies 
underlying both the substantive law and the Seventh Amendment.23 And 
what is the point if, as Miller appears to conclude, the absolute baseline 
should be set at a point where, predictably, an inference satisfying the 
requirement will often not be as strong as “competing inferences taken 
together”?24 That, after all, is the situation with which his putative 
 
 18.  Miller, supra note 2, at 511; see id. at 533 (“[T]here is no deference 
accorded to inferences of scienter aside from the stipulation that a tie goes to the 
plaintiff.”). In rejecting a “super-comparative-strength standard,” id. at 514, as the 
baseline for his putative discrete cogency requirement, Professor Miller observes that it 
“would nullify the requirement of comparative inferential strength as an independent 
factor, notwithstanding the clear emphasis in the Tellabs opinion on the importance of 
this analysis.” Id. Indeed it would. Because the comparative analysis alone engaged the 
Court’s attention, it seems unlikely that the justices intended to smuggle another 
requirement through the front door. 
 19. See Makor, 513 F.3d at 707; supra text accompanying note 14. 
 20. Miller, supra note 2, at 515. 
 21. Makor, 513 F.3d at 711. 
 22. See Miller, supra note 2, at 515. The notion that one can evaluate the 
strength of an inference—determine where it falls on the baseline—without first (or, 
apart from) making the comparison Professor Miller calls for, neglects Judge Posner’s 
reminder. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 23. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in 
Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 591, 623 (2004) (contending that neither the Seventh Amendment, as interpreted, 
nor the Supreme Court’s 1985–86 summary-judgment trilogy provides much protection 
against “a court that, for whatever reason, has an expansive definition of chaff and 
hence is impatient with the pleas of a litigant to continue with an apparently weak 
case”). 
 24. Miller, supra note 2, at 512. Professor Miller apparently favors an 
“intermediate standard” that (in his example) posits a 20 percent probability for the 
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discrete cogency requirement is supposed to deal. Thus, it is no 
surprise that this putative requirement is nowhere to be seen in the last 
two thirds of Professor Miller’s paper, where he very valuably explores 
the process of inference in typical scenarios presented by securities-
fraud cases.25 
II. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES 
One of the foundational assumptions of modern American 
procedure is that the Rules Enabling Act’s reference to “general rules” 
forecloses the promulgation of different prospective rules for cases that 
involve different bodies of substantive law. The Advisory Committee 
that the Supreme Court appointed in 1935 discussed the meaning of that 
phrase at its first meeting.26 The focus of the discussion was whether, 
as one of its members had contended in a remarkable piece of 
revisionist history published the year before,27 the Enabling Act could 
be read to accommodate different rules on the same subject (e.g., 
discovery) for the district courts in different states—in other words, 
conformity to state law as under the Conformity Act of 1872.28 Firmly 
 
inference of scienter, and three competing inferences not implicating scienter with 
probabilities of 25 percent, 25 percent, and 30 percent, respectively. See id. Although 
the example does indeed “illustrat[e] that the two tests can be applied independently of 
one another,” id. at 515, it also illustrates why the discrete cogency requirement he 
champions would usually not do the work that supposedly justifies its existence. 
 25. See id. at 515–34. 
 26. Summary of Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
on Rules (June 20, 1935), available at Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, 
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935–1988, No. CI-103-30, at 6–7 
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (microforms) [hereinafter Summary of Proceedings] (“The first 
matter considered was the meaning of the term general rules as used in the statute, and 
whether the statute contemplates that all rules promulgated shall operate uniformly in 
all the districts, or whether the Court may promulgate some rules for some districts and 
other rules for other districts. In this connection the discussion covered the question of 
conformity between state and federal practice. After full discussion, it was the 
unanimous opinion of those present that the statute contemplates that in so far as unified 
rules are promulgated they must operate uniformly in all the districts . . . .”).  
 27. See Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rulemaking Power to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1128 (1934); see also 
Edson R. Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. 
Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A. J. 404, 405 (1935). The 
Michigan Law Review article almost cost its author a seat on the Advisory Committee, 
and Charles Clark used it to advance his own interest in becoming the reporter. See 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1135–36 (1982) (discussing Sunderland’s revisionist articles, the discussion at the 
Advisory Committee’s first meeting, and Clark’s maneuvering). 
 28. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. Sunderland 
could not attend this meeting. See Summary of Proceedings, supra note 26, at 1. 
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(and correctly) rejecting this position,29 the Advisory Committee seems 
simply to have assumed that its interpretation of general rules in that 
respect entrained the additional requirement that rules promulgated 
under the Enabling Act not only be geographically uniform, but 
transsubstantive.30 
The meaning of the Enabling Act aside, the normative question 
whether we are well served today by a rule-making enterprise that 
continues to frame rules and amendments for all cases filed in federal 
district court, no matter what the source or content of the substantive 
law, has been a subject of vigorous discussion and debate in the 
literature.31 Defenders of this foundational assumption have, by and 
large, ignored the fact that those questioning it are not calling for 
wholly different procedural regimes for different bodies of substantive 
law.32 The call in this respect has been for consideration of altering 
only discrete Federal Rules, or portions thereof, that do not 
satisfactorily implement the policies underlying a body of substantive 
law or a particular scheme of substantive rights, with all other Federal 
 
 29. See id. at 7. 
 30. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, 
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713–14 n.140 (1988) 
[hereinafter Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion] (“The question whether uniformity 
necessarily entails trans-substantivity was not addressed probably because it was 
assumed.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: 
The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1935 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, 
Transformation] (noting a lack of support for that position in legislative history of the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 or in the long history preceding its enactment); Stephen N. 
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 956–61 (1987); id. at 995–96 
(“Such an integration of procedure and substance, however, would have required a 
degree of technicality, categorization, and definition that was at odds with the simplicity 
and uniformity themes the proponents had developed to propel their reform.”). As 
Professor Bone maintains, the common view that procedure was independent of 
substantive law “implied that procedural rules could and should be general in nature 
and ‘trans-substantive.’” Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for 
Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324 (2008). 
 31. See, e.g., Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 30 (criticizing 
insistence on transsubstantivity); Paul A. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of 
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989) (defending 
transsubstantivity); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Federal Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 731 (1975); Subrin, supra note 30. 
Recently, Professor Bone has asserted that “we must bury, once and for all, the 
thoroughly misguided idea that transsubstantivity is an independent value or ideal for 
the Federal Rules.” Bone, supra note 30, at 333. 
 32. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-
Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 
2244 (1989) (“This critique contemplates separate sets of rule[s] for civil rights cases, 
antitrust cases, routine automobile cases, and so on.”). 
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Rules remaining applicable.33 Notwithstanding this discussion and 
debate, and notwithstanding dramatic evidence of the costs of 
transsubstantive procedure furnished by, for example, the modern class 
action under Federal Rule 23 as amended in 1966,34 transsubstantivity 
has remained a foundational assumption for all subsequent advisory 
committees. An important reason may be that departures from it raise 
questions of institutional power and legitimacy.35 
Another foundational assumption of modern American procedure 
is that judicial discretion is to be preferred to formalism (defined as a 
preference for rules having substantial determinative content).36 This is 
also an operating principle entailed by the first foundational 
assumption, that is, by the supposed attributes of general rules. For 
rules of the scope required by the traditional interpretation of that term, 
formalism is hopeless.37 In any event, viewed either as a normative 
preference or as a practical necessity, this characteristic of modern 
American procedure is hardly surprising when one considers that the 
 
 33. See Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 30, at 716–17 (noting 
the existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing orders 
and asking, “[W]hy should we not have uniform rules that govern such cases, and those 
like them, in the respects in which they are deemed atypical, either because of their 
procedural requirements or the requirements of the substantive law?”); see also Stephen 
N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective 
Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994). As I have previously noted:  
No one I know is suggesting a return to the forms of action or a wholesale 
rejection of transsubstantive procedure. Some of us, however, are 
suggesting that it is time both to face facts (in particular the fact that 
uniformity and transsubstantivity rhetoric are a sham) and to find out the 
facts (in particular the facts about discretionary justice). A “veil of 
ignorance” may be an apt metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date. 
It is not, I contend, an appropriate normative posture for the rulemakers of 
the future.  
 Burbank, Transformation, supra note 30, at 1940–41; see Bone, supra note 30, at 
333–34; id. at 334 (“[The o]ptimal level of generality should be determined not by 
reference to some trans-substantive ideal, but by balancing the costs and benefits of 
general versus specific rules.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic 
Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1927–31 (2006) 
(discussing the problem of inefficient overenforcement posed by small-claims class-
action lawsuits under Federal Rule 23). 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 110, 119. 
 36. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 9 (1963) 
(“[A] rule, to have cognitive and normative significance as such, must have an 
important degree of determinative content to the group to whom it is addressed.”). 
 37. See Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 30, at 715 (“Federal 
Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by 
trial judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense.”); 
Burbank, Transformation, supra note 30, at 1940–41 (“[U]niformity and trans-
substantivity rhetoric are a sham.”).  
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chief architects of the original 1938 Federal Rules were steeped in 
knowledge of the costs of inflexibility associated with common law and 
code procedure, infatuated with the flexibility of equity (to the point of 
ignoring its costs), and thoroughly versed in both the ethos of 
progressive regulation and the lessons of legal realism.38 
Another operating principle, related to, but not required by, the 
foundational assumption concerning general rules, is that different rules 
should not (usually) be written for cases having different procedural 
needs, as for instance to establish different procedural tracks.39 Whether 
this (as it were) transprocedural impulse has been thought a necessary 
(or useful) protection for transsubstantivity or for the discretion of the 
individual district-court judge, it was in any event sufficiently strong to 
prevent any district court from effectively responding to a congressional 
call for experimentation with procedural tracking in 1990.40 When one 
considers that the federal courts are effectively inaccessible to many 
whose claims satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of the 
diversity statute,41 it does not seem far-fetched to believe that, like that 
 
 38. See Subrin, supra note 30, passim ; see also Burbank, supra note 23, at 
597–98 & n.20 (discussing the ties of the two chief architects of the Federal Rules to 
the Progressive and Legal Realism movements). For another view of “the Progressive 
drive for procedural uniformity,” see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of 
Progressive Proceduralism , 61 TEX. L. REV. 929 (1983) (reviewing JULIUS LEVINE, 
DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW 
WITH REFORM PROPOSALS (1982)). Professor Graham attributes its embrace by 
academics to  
[their] unconscious understanding that lack of uniformity is a threat to the 
claim that procedure is a value-free science. If there is more than one 
scientifically valid way to litigate, then the choice of one or the other 
procedural system must be based on values; in other words, the selection of 
one mode of proceeding over another is a political choice. 
 Id. at 945. 
 39. For a limited exception, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting eight 
categories of cases from the initial-disclosure requirement). 
 40. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, 
SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 11–13 (1996); id. at 12 (“The consequence was that 
almost all general civil cases to which CJRA [Civil Justice Reform Act] procedural 
principles might be relevant were placed in the standard track, if any tracking 
assignment was made.”). 
 41. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, FEDERAL LITIGATION—WHERE DID IT GO OFF 
TRACK? (2008), available at http://www.josephnyc.com/articles/viewarticle.php?53 
(“Twenty-five years ago, on January 1, 1983, it cost parties roughly the same to litigate 
in state and federal court. Plaintiffs chose federal court sometimes for expansive 
discovery or to get a good judge, even though state court was an available alternative 
and additur impermissible in federal court. Today, plaintiffs with non-federal causes of 
action flee federal court, and those with federal claims scour the books for state law 
analogues.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil 
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requirement itself, this transprocedural impulse has been useful to 
ensure that the business of the federal courts is business.42 
Finally, again not logically entailed (by the foundational 
assumption that judicial discretion is to be preferred to formalism) but 
institutionally convenient, is an operating principle that translates that 
preference into a preference for judicial power and, under the cover of 
the Enabling Act Process, paints statutory procedure as illegitimate, 
even when crafted for territory outside of the supposed boundaries of 
that process (because substance specific). It is quite literally astonishing 
that the institutional federal judiciary has repeatedly objected when 
Congress has proposed to do what the rule makers contend they cannot 
do, namely, fashion a particular procedural rule for a particular 
substantive context thought to require a departure from the Federal 
Rules. One of the occasions for such objections was the consideration 
of bills that became the PSLRA.43 As I have previously observed: 
 
[B]ehind the judiciary’s objections there may, therefore, lie 
either a claim that the Federal Rules represent the best 
accommodation of procedural values, and the best 
effectuation of substantive values, for every type of case in 
federal court, or a claim that the costs to such values are 
outweighed by the benefits of formally uniform procedure.44  
 
Litigation: Curse or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE 163 (2008); infra text accompanying notes 
121–23. 
 42. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 256 (1992) (“[T]he 
Justices generally if implicitly believed that they should maintain federal jurisdiction 
over issues and interests that they regarded as having national importance.”); Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1533 (2008) (suggesting that the supposed 
need to deal with overlapping class-action lawsuits “may provide cover to those among 
CAFA’s [Class Action Fairness Act] supporters, in and out of Congress, who do not 
wish to be associated with the notion that the business of the federal courts is 
business”). 
 43. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of 
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1702, 1729, 1731 (2004) (discussing the 
judiciary’s opposition to various congressional bills containing procedural provisions, 
including bills that led to the PSLRA). 
 44. Id. at 1731. Formally uniform as used here refers not to formalism, but to 
the fact that the Federal Rules are largely uniform only in appearance, not in fact. See 
supra note 37. I have also noted:  
An objection that invokes “The Enabling Act Process” may simply (albeit 
fecklessly) signal the judiciary’s concern that, given the circumstances in 
which so much contemporary legislation is enacted, described above, 
statutory procedure is unlikely to be well made, viewed either discretely or 
as part of the larger procedural landscape in which it will repose. 
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Or again:  
 
[F]or those many matters where the Federal Rules make no 
choices, leaving the procedure/substance accommodation to 
discretionary decision making, the claim must be that 
Congress’s substantive agenda is always better served by 
trusting to the discretion of federal judges and thus abjuring 
the potentially potent technique of using procedure to drive, 
or to mask, substance.45 
III. PLEADING AND THE DILEMMAS OF “GENERAL RULES” 
Professor Miller quotes Judge Posner’s observation that, “To 
judges raised on notice pleading, the idea of drawing a ‘strong 
inference’ from factual allegations is mysterious.”46 Until quite 
recently, much of Miller’s paper might have induced cognitive 
dissonance in those who practice, or are otherwise concerned with, 
pleading in the federal courts. But times have changed, and pleading’s 
new—or, more precisely, renewed47—prominence in the procedural 
landscape is hardly confined to cases brought under the PSLRA. 
Indeed, many of Professor Miller’s observations about the post-Tellabs 
world of pleading and Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss in cases 
governed by the PSLRA may be applicable more generally as a result 
of another Supreme Court pleading decision during the October Term  
2006, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.48 
In Twombly, the Court reinstated the dismissal under Federal Rule 
12(b)(6) of an antitrust-conspiracy complaint brought under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act against the regional telecommunications-service 
providers remaining after the breakup of AT&T. The plaintiffs alleged 
two different types of anticompetitive parallel conduct, the first 
reflecting a conspiracy to prevent competitors from entering the 
defendants’ existing service areas, and the second a conspiracy to 
ensure that the defendants did not compete in each other’s service 
areas. The plaintiffs inferred the latter conspiracy from the companies’ 
 
 Burbank, supra note 43, at 1731. 
 45. Id. at 1731–32. 
 46. Miller, supra note 2, at 509 n.10 (quoting Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. 
Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 47. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1975–77 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing notice pleading as a response to “[t]he English 
experience with Byzantine special pleading-rules” and the Field Code’s requirement of 
pleading “‘facts’ rather than ‘conclusions’”). 
 48. Id. at 1955. 
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“failure meaningfully [to] pursu[e] attractive business opportunities,” 
and from a statement by Qwest Communications International Inc.’s 
CEO that such competition might be profitable.49 In reversing a panel 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court 
abrogated the long-standing standard of Conley v. Gibson 50 that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed . . . unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle him 
to relief.”51 Agreeing, however, with Conley that a complaint must give 
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests,”52 the Court interpreted the latter as requiring that its “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”53 The Court then held that, for a section 1 Sherman 
Act claim, these standards “require[d] a claim with enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”54 It 
concluded that the plaintiffs rested their claims on “parallel conduct and 
not on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the” 
companies,55 and that the statements of the Qwest CEO were taken out 
of context.56 
The courts of appeals have struggled to determine Twombly ’s 
precise meaning and scope of application, and their efforts have 
resulted in different approaches.57 In Iqbal v. Hasty,58 the Second 
Circuit recognized conflicting signals in the Court’s opinion, 
concluding:  
 
[T]he Court is not requiring a universal standard of 
heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible 
“plausibility standard,” which obliges a pleader to amplify a 
 
 49. Id. at 1962. 
 50. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 51. Id. at 45–46; see Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 (“This famous observation 
has earned its retirement.”). 
 52. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). 
 53. Id. at 1965. 
 54.  Id. 
 55. Id. at 1970. 
 56. See id. at 1972 n.13. 
 57. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits have directly addressed the issue. 
Others have noticed its effect. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 
188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the wake of Twombly, courts and commentators have been 
grappling with the decision’s meaning and reach.”). 
 58.  490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008). 
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claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where 
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.59  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 
emphasized Twombly ’s twin prongs of notice and plausibility, 
concluding that it required “enough facts to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary 
element.”60 Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has focused on notice,61 while admitting that Twombly 
probably did not change the notice requirement.62 In addition, another 
panel of that court has endorsed a standard that requires greater 
particularity in light of the burdens of discovery in complex litigation,63 
an approach anticipated by the Second Circuit in Iqbal.64 
There is an important difference, however, between Professor 
Miller’s project and the business of sorting out the confusion that 
Twombly has created. The ambiguities Miller explores arise in the 
interpretation of statutory language prescribing procedural requirements 
for a specific substantive context. They thus emerge from a democratic 
process which, even if known for strategic ambiguity,65 is 
acknowledged as appropriate for the resolution of broad questions of 
social policy such as those—access to court, competition for legal 
services, and norm enforcement—to which Miller adverts at the end of 
 
 59. Id. at 157–58. Since then, the Second Circuit has acknowledged that Iqbal 
“does not offer much guidance to plaintiffs regarding when factual ‘amplification [is] 
needed to render [a] claim plausible.’” Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158). 
 60. Phillips v. Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 61. See Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 
663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 782 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
 62. See Concentra, 496 F.3d at 782–83 n.4. 
 63. See Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“RICO cases, like antitrust cases, are ‘big’ cases and the defendant should not be put 
to the expense of big-case discovery on the basis of a thread-bare claim.”). 
 64. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157–58. 
 65. Professors Grundfest and Pritchard’s work on the strategic uses of 
ambiguity by Congress and the federal courts used the PSLRA as the basis for 
empirical testing of their general hypotheses. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. 
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in 
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002). Of particular 
interest for present purposes are their views (1) that Congress chose to “sidestep,” id. 
at 658, the state of mind required for liability (i.e., is recklessness or knowledge 
required?) in favor of tightening the pleading standard required to withstand a motion to 
dismiss, and (2) that the resulting strong-inference requirement was the subject of 
intense debate and disagreement and is itself an example of strategic ambiguity. See id. 
at 652–66. 
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his paper.66 If any policy choices are buried in statutory procedure, the 
resulting concern involves democratic accountability in the weak sense, 
namely duly authorized actors taking responsibility for their decisions.67 
Moreover, ambiguous or not, the choices operate only in the 
substantive context that is the subject of the legislation. 
Twombly ’s ambiguities, on the other hand, arise in the 
interpretation of prospective court rules crafted for all civil actions in 
the federal courts. They thus emerge from a process that, although it 
has increasingly come to resemble the legislative process in recent 
decades,68 is not acknowledged as appropriate for the resolution of 
broad questions of social policy. If any such policy choices are buried 
in the Federal Rules—or (more likely) in discretionary decisions made 
under their authority—the resulting concern involves democratic 
accountability in both the weak sense previously defined and in the 
strong sense of separation of powers.69 Moreover, even if animated by 
the perceived substantive or procedural needs of antitrust law and 
litigation, Twombly’s choices cannot comfortably be confined to that 
context by reason of another foundational assumption, one that the 
Court has emphatically endorsed in the pleading context on more than 
one occasion.70 General rules made through the Enabling Act Process 
can only be changed through that process (or by legislation).71 
 
 66. See Miller, supra note 2, at 530–34. 
 67. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1463, 1475 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (1985)). 
 68. See Burbank, supra note 43, at 1724 (“[T]he changes in the rulemaking 
process in the 1980s that were designed to open it up to more and more diverse points 
of view, make it more transparent, and diminish the need for congressional 
involvement, may in fact have facilitated a process of redundancy wherein participants 
treat rulemaking that is at all controversial as merely the first act.”). 
 69. See Burbank, supra note 67, at 1475. 
 70. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163, 168 (1993) (“Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against 
municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of 
Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by the process of amending the 
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”). But see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 
199, 212 (2007) (“In a series of recent cases, we have explained that courts should 
generally not depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of 
perceived policy concerns.”) “Generally”? The Court’s unanimous opinion in this case, 
rejecting all of the three procedural roadblocks that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit had created to thwart prisoner litigation, including a heightened 
pleading requirement, may here anticipate Twombly as a departure from “the usual 
practice.” Jones was argued on October 30, 2006. Id. at 199. Twombly was argued on 
November 27, 2006. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1955 (2007). Perhaps Jones was designed to 
anticipate and calm fears engendered by Twombly, which may explain why it so 
thoroughly confounds the attitudinal model of judicial behavior. See Stephen B. 
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Still, Professor Miller helps us to see that, by tracking distinctions 
between the PSLRA’s provisions regarding fact pleading and probative 
force72 and relating them to different requirements in the Federal Rules, 
we may be able to grasp the architecture of the Court’s decision in 
Twombly. We are thus in a better position to understand, even if we 
have trouble accepting, the Court’s assertion that the latter decision did 
not change the requirements of Federal Rule 8 (or Federal Rule 9).73 In 
particular, we can now clearly see that Twombly’s plausibility 
requirement has more to do with Federal Rule 12(b)(6) than it does 
with Federal Rule 8,74 confirming the message suggested by careful 
attention to the role of the language in Conley 75 that the Twombly 
 
Burbank, The Greening of Harry Blackmun, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 137, 142 
(2007) (“I doubt that either an attitudinal or a strategic model of judicial behavior can 
explain a decision like Jones v. Bock.”); see also infra note 88 (discussing Erickson v. 
Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007)). 
 71. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) (“[W]e are 
bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are not free 
to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling 
Act.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“The text of a 
rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to 
amend a rule outside of the process Congress ordered, a process properly tuned to the 
instruction that rules of procedure ‘shall not abridge . . . any substantive 
right.’”(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))).  
 72. The PSLRA provision on scienter deals with both. See 15 U.S.C. § 74u-
4(b)(2) (2006); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 508 n.3. 
 73. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (“[W]e do 
not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”). 
 74. Cf. Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (“Where the plaintiff has gone astray is in supposing that a complaint which 
complies with Rule 8(a)(2) is immune from a motion to dismiss.”). 
 75. The Court in Conley treated separately the question whether the complaint 
in that case stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and whether it was 
defective for failure to set forth specific facts. As to the former, the Court followed 
“the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45–46. This is the “famous 
observation” that the Twombly Court said had “earned its retirement.” 127 S. Ct. at 
1969; see supra note 51 and accompanying text. In subsequently rejecting the 
respondents’ contention that the complaint was insufficiently specific, the Conley Court 
regarded as the “decisive answer . . . that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.” 355 
U.S. at 47. In that regard, the Court observed that “[s]uch simplified ‘notice pleading’ 
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial 
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim 
and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues,” id. at 47–48, 
referring in a footnote to, among others, Federal Rule 12(e). Id. at 48 n.9. 
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Court repudiated.76 That said, it is unfortunate that the Court (1) 
obscured this message in loose talk about the notice-giving function of 
pleadings under the Federal Rules, which has nothing to do with 
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) as opposed to Federal Rule 12(e);77 and (2) failed 
to spell out why allegations of conspiracy in the Twombly complaint 
should be viewed differently than the allegation that “the defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff” in an Official 
Form accompanying the Federal Rules.78 
Tellabs ’s distinction between plausible and strong (or cogent) 
inferences may also be helpful in divining the proper application of 
Twombly if, as lower-court decisions suggest, the Court’s reasoning 
 
 76. To the extent that Conley’s interpretation of the standard under Federal 
Rule 12(b)(6) faithfully reflected the Court’s understanding of the meaning of that rule 
when first promulgated, Twombly ’s rejection of the operative language was 
inconsistent with the notion that the Court was “bound to follow [Federal Rule 
12(b)(6)] as [the Court] understood it upon its adoption.” Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 861; see 
also supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970 n.10. In that regard, the Court elevated 
another passage in Conley to status as part of, rather than a gloss on, Federal Rule 8. 
See id. at 1964 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to 
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.’” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)). Although this passage occurs in that part of 
Conley where the Court rejected the respondents’ contention that the complaint was 
insufficiently specific, see supra note 75, the Twombly Court used it to support the 
proposition that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action will not do.” 127 S. Ct. at 1965; see also supra text 
accompanying note 52. 
 78. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970 (“Although in form a few stray statements 
speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions resting 
on the prior allegations.”); see id. at 1971 n.11. Perhaps “legal conclusions” are those 
the plausibility (reasonableness) of which cannot be confirmed on the basis of the rest 
of the complaint assessed in light of both background knowledge about human behavior 
and the substantive law. Thus, it is not implausible that the driver of a car that strikes a 
pedestrian has been negligent in some respect. Cf. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–
58 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e believe the Court is not requiring a universal standard of 
heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ 
which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those 
contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”). 
Alternatively, the complaint in Form 11 (formerly Form 9) does not require the adverb 
negligently in order to withstand a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion, even if one deems the 
allegation of negligence a legal conclusion. See infra text accompanying note 85. In that 
regard, the Court left the adverb negligently out of its discussion of the Form 9 
complaint. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970–71 n.10. But see Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 156 
(“The Court noted that Form 9 specifies the particular highway the plaintiff was 
crossing and the date and time of the accident . . . but took no notice of the total lack of 
an allegation of the respects in which the defendant is alleged to have been negligent 
. . . .”). 
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and interpretations are not confined to complaints alleging antitrust 
conspiracy under the Sherman Act.79 The problem here is that certain 
language in Twombly can be read to mean that the Court’s standard—
by hypothesis, generally applicable—is more demanding than the 
standard under the PSLRA. The language in question can be read to 
require that inferences—or to the extent that a complaint does not rely 
on inferences, direct allegations—grounding liability not just be 
plausible in the Tellabs sense (reasonable), and not just as strong 
(cogent or compelling) as any competing account, but stronger than any 
account of nonliability.80 Of course, that would be ridiculous. The 
answer to this puzzle lies in Twombly ’s substantive-law context and in 
the Court’s reading of the complaint. As to the former, previous 
decisions had established that, although parallel conduct grounds a 
permissible inference of conspiracy, such evidence is insufficient as a 
matter of law to warrant a finding of conspiracy.81 As to the latter, 
rightly or wrongly, the Court in Twombly read the complaint as 
alleging only parallel conduct (refusing to count, among other things, 
what it deemed legal conclusions of conspiracy).82 On this view, in 
other words, Twombly was a case in which the plaintiffs pleaded 
themselves out of court.83 
 
 79. See, e.g., Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157 n.7 (“For example, it would be cavalier 
to believe that the Court’s rejection of the ‘no set of facts’ language from Conley, 
which has been cited by federal courts at least 10,000 times in a wide variety of 
contexts (according to a Westlaw search), applies only to section 1 antitrust claims.”). 
For an excellent analysis of Twombly from this perspective, see A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008). 
 80. See, e.g., Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (describing parallel conduct as 
“consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and 
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the 
market”); id. at 1966 (“[W]hen allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to 
make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a 
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent 
action.”). 
 81. Id. at 1982 (“Under Matsushita, a plaintiff’s allegations of an illegal 
conspiracy may not, at the summary judgment stage, rest solely on the inferences that 
may be drawn from the parallel conduct of the defendants.” (citing Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986))). 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 1967; id. at 1971 n.11 (“[I]n fact, they proceeded 
exclusively via allegations of parallel conduct.”); see also id. at 1972 n.13 (noting that 
comments by the CEO of Qwest were taken out of context). 
 83. For an early analysis of Twombly along these lines, see Allan Ides, Bell 
Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 
F.R.D. 604 (2007); see also Scott Dodson, Essay, Pleading Standards After Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 139 (2007), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf. This view of the 
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Most cases are not subject to a requirement of fact pleading, 
whether imposed by statute or by Federal Rule 9(b). More important, 
in most substantive-law areas the courts have not finely and 
categorically policed the inferences that juries are permitted to draw.84 
In such garden-variety cases, I suggest, a pleading that provides 
sufficient notice to survive a Federal Rule 12(e) motion should also 
survive a motion under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) if its nonconclusory 
allegations, taken as true, and any inferences reasonably drawn from 
them, tell a plausible (as the Tellabs Court would define it) story of 
liability. As suggested, whether allegations are disregarded as legal 
conclusions may depend on whether, without more factual allegations, 
the complaint tells a story that is both reasonably possible in light of 
human experience as determined by background knowledge and, if 
true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief.85 Finally in this regard, as the 
Second Circuit’s post-Twombly opinion in Iqbal confirms, judgments 
about plausibility, like those about cogency or strength, are necessarily 
comparative.86 
Whether the ambiguity of the Court’s opinion in Twombly was 
strategic—designed to empower the lower courts to vary requirements 
 
case finds additional support in subsequent remarks of the author of the Court’s 
opinion: 
[I]n Bell Atlantic you had a set of allegations in which in effect it was an 
either or choice. There were two possibilities consistent with the allegations 
in Bell Atlantic. One was a conspiracy possibility, one was a lawful parallel 
conduct possibility. And there just wasn’t any way to pick one as being a 
more probable interpretation of what they were getting at. 
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) 
[hereinafter Iqbal Transcript] (No. 07-1015) (statement of Justice Souter). Finally, this 
appears to be the view of the D.C. Circuit. See Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 
v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In sum, Twombly was 
concerned with the plausibility of an inference of conspiracy, not with the plausibility 
of a claim.”). 
 84. Note, however, an analogous phenomenon in connection with summary 
judgment, when courts have carved the evidence or the law into smaller segments to 
make cases amenable to pretrial judicial resolution. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 
624–25 (discussing “factual carving, a process that does not require more of the whole 
but sees less in the parts by subjecting the nonmovant’s ‘evidence’ to piece-by-piece 
analysis,” and “legal carving, whereby the law is subdivided into smaller, more 
objective units, thus ramifying the issues as to which an adequate factual showing 
(however defined) must be made”). 
 85. For a similar interpretation of Twombly, see Robert G. Bone, Twombly, 
Pleading Rules and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/ 
2008.html. 
 86. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted 
sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008); see also Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2008). 
BURBANK - FINAL 4/7/2009 10:23 AM 
554 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
to withstand a motion to dismiss87 depending on perceived differences 
in procedural demands (i.e., discovery) and/or substantive contexts, 
with the Court retaining the power to police egregious excesses while 
preserving deniability88—remains to be seen. An alternative account is 
simply that the Court’s goal of changing the Federal Rules outside of 
the Enabling Act Process without admitting that it was doing so 
understandably yielded a confusing opinion. We may have an answer 
very soon; review of the Second Circuit’s Iqbal decision may force the 
Court to elaborate the acceptable ways by which the requirements of 
substantive law can alter general rules in operation. 
The Iqbal case involves claims brought by a citizen of Pakistan 
whom federal officials arrested after the 9/11 attacks and detained at the 
(federal) Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, 
pending trial on charges (of fraud in connection with identification 
documents) to which he ultimately pleaded guilty, leading to his 
removal to Pakistan. The complaint alleged that Iqbal’s arrest and 
seven-month confinement in highly restrictive conditions resulted from 
unlawful racial and religious discrimination. It also alleged that a 
number of lower-level Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
Bureau of Prisons officials and employees were liable for violations of 
his rights, due to use of excessive force, unreasonable and unnecessary 
strip and body-cavity searches, and denial of medical care while in 
detention. Finally, Iqbal asserted that Robert Mueller, Director of the 
FBI, and John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, adopted 
and/or approved policies and directives pursuant to which he was 
arrested and confined, policies and directives that were purposefully 
designed to discriminate on the basis of religion and race.89 
 
 87. One who accepts the view of Twombly suggested here probably should 
not refer to that case as a “pleading decision” unless the intended audience would 
understand that the reference was to the sufficiency of the complaint to withstand a 
motion under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), as opposed to Federal Rule 12(e). 
 88. Editorial, The Devil in the Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52 (2007) (“More 
probably, Twombly is an exercise in strategic ambiguity that empowers the lower 
federal courts to tighten pleading requirements in cases or categories of cases that augur 
similar discovery burdens (or are otherwise disfavored), while preserving deniability in 
the Court through the use of its discretionary docket to correct perceived excesses (as in 
Erickson).”). The author was chair of the Editorial Committee of the American 
Judicature Society at the time this editorial was published. The reference is to Erickson 
v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), a case decided a few weeks after Twombly (without 
argument and per curiam) in which the Court reversed the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s affirmance of a judgment dismissing a prisoner’s 
complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). For reasons why Erickson does not provide 
much comfort for those concerned that Twombly is generally applicable (not confined 
to antitrust cases), see Editorial, supra. On strategic ambiguity more generally, see 
supra note 65. 
 89. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 147–49, 165, 174–76. 
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In affirming the district court’s decision denying motions to 
dismiss four counts against Mueller and Ashcroft, Judge Jon Newman 
for a panel of the Second Circuit sought to apply Twombly, which had 
been decided less than two months earlier. He concluded: 
[T]he allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and 
agreed to the discrimination that the plaintiff alleges satisfies 
the plausibility standard [of Twombly] without an allegation 
of subsidiary facts because of the likelihood that these senior 
officials would have concerned themselves with the 
formulation and implementation of policies dealing with the 
confinement of those arrested on federal charges in the New 
York City area and designated “of high interest” in the 
aftermath of 9/11.90 
The Supreme Court granted the solicitor general’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari.91 In its brief, the government argued that, in 
furtherance of the policies underlying the defense of official immunity, 
the Court should require that complaints against high-level government 
officials contain “‘specific, nonconclusory factual allegations’ that 
establish . . . cognizable injury.”92 
Particularly because Judge Newman’s opinion in Iqbal is such a 
clear and (dare I say) cogent interpretation of Twombly, I can only 
hope that attachment to substantive law for which the Court has been 
responsible—the federal common-law defense of official immunity—
does not lead it further to deform the general pleading landscape. There 
is no need for the Court to do so, although the path to a satisfactory 
accommodation is not without potholes. 
If substantive federal common law can displace—or, for those who 
prefer the cosmetic attribution of the policy choice to Congress, if a 
federal statute interpreted in light of its underlying policies can 
 
 90. Id. at 175–76; see also id. at 166 (“Even as to Ashcroft and Mueller, it is 
plausible to believe that senior officials of the [Department of Justice] would be aware 
of the policies concerning the detention of those arrested in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
would know about, condone, or otherwise have personal involvement in the 
implementation of those policies.”). 
 91. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008). 
 92. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (No. 07-1015) (quoting 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)); see id. at 28; Brief of Professors of 
Civil Procedure and Federal Practice as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24 
n.3, Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (No. 07-1015) [hereinafter Professors’ Amicus Brief] 
(“[T]he Government seeks to convert the Court’s description of a discretionary 
judgment pertaining to what a district court might do under Rules 7(a) and 12(e) into a 
mandatory heightened pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2).”). The author contributed 
to, and is a signatory of, this amicus brief. 
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preempt93—nonsubstantive state law in state court, surely it can also 
supplant a Federal Rule in federal court. Actually, that is not clear 
because of the Enabling Act’s supersession clause.94 That is territory in 
which, because the clause privileges the last in time, insistence on 
cosmetic attribution to Congress can cause difficulty.95 Without such 
attribution, however, the argument that the Court makes law anew 
every time it applies judge-made law to different facts may be an 
adequate postrealist response. Certainly, this argument has force when 
the Court changes the content of judge-made law. The question remains 
how best to implement the perceived requirements of substantive 
federal common law without further deforming the general landscape 
left by Twombly. 
There can be no serious question of inadequate notice in Iqbal even 
if that were a relevant question under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (as opposed 
to Federal Rule 12(e)).96 Moreover, Judge Newman’s careful analysis 
of the complaint as pleaded with respect to the defendants of interest—
the attorney general and the director of the FBI—would make it difficult 
to hold that a general plausibility test under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) had 
not been met. To do so, indeed, seemingly would advance the 
 
 93. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (stating that a Wisconsin 
state court cannot apply the short Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute in a federal civil-
rights action); infra note 102 (discussing applicability in state court of a pleading 
requirement found necessary to protect the federal common law of official immunity). 
For discussion of Felder, including its use of the language of preemption, see Stephen 
B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1557–58 (1992); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32–39 (1985) (noting the Court’s 
failure to realize that preemptive lawmaking can be used to develop a general theory of 
federal common law). 
 94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (“All laws in conflict with such rules 
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”). For the 
origins and purposes of the supersession clause, see Burbank, supra note 27, at 1051 
n.156. For more recent developments involving it, including the unsuccessful attempt to 
delete it from the Enabling Act as part of the 1988 amendments, see Stephen B. 
Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1036–46. 
 95. Concern that the 2007 amendments designed to restyle the Federal Rules 
without affecting their meaning might otherwise be given superseding effect under 
section 2072(b) caused the rule makers to include among them the following: “If any 
provision in Rules 1–5.1, 6–73, or 77–86 conflicts with another law, priority in time 
for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) is not affected by the amendments taking effect 
on December 1, 2007.” FED. R. CIV. P. 86(b). 
 96. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (“And like the Form 9 complaint approved in 
Bell Atlantic, Iqbal’s complaint informs all of the defendants of the time frame and 
place of the alleged violations.”); id. at 156 (linking assessment of “legal conclusions” 
to whether “the defendant is given notice of the date, time, and place where the legally 
vulnerable conduct occurred”); supra note 78. 
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argument, absurd on its face, that the Federal Rules impose on 
plaintiffs generally a more demanding standard to survive a motion to 
dismiss than does the PSLRA on plaintiffs in securities-fraud cases.97 
The government denies that it is calling for the imposition of a 
heightened fact-pleading requirement in cases against high-level 
government officials who are entitled to the immunity defense,98 as well 
it might because the Court seems to have made it impossible for the 
judiciary to openly impose such a requirement other than through the 
Enabling Act Process.99 
The Court may, however, accept the Second Circuit’s view of 
Twombly as prescribing a flexible “plausibility standard,” but take a 
different view of the appropriate contextual plausibility judgment than 
did the lower courts in Iqbal.100 If so, the Court would thereby confirm 
the view that Twombly is an invitation to the lower courts to make ad 
hoc decisions, often reflecting buried policy choices, and in any event 
with little fear of reversal because of the impotence of federal appellate 
review to police discretionary decision making.101  
 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 80. I share the Second Circuit’s view 
that the allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller were personally involved in the adoption 
and/or approval of the policies and directives challenged in Iqbal tell a story that is 
plausible (not unreasonable). See supra text accompanying note 90. Note that the Iqbal 
complaint does not attempt to hold those individuals responsible for the quotidian 
abuses during confinement that it alleges in claims against lower-level officials and 
employees. See Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 92, at 15 (“Thus, while the 
complaint does charge several individuals with ad hoc violations of the plaintiff’s rights 
. . . neither Ashcroft nor Mueller is named in any of these fact-specific counts.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Iqbal Transcript, supra note 83, at 11 (statement of Solicitor 
General Garre) (“And we’re not asking for a heightened pleading standard, Justice 
Ginsburg.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 12, Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (No. 07-1015) 
(“Petitioners do not ask the Court to adopt any heightened pleading standard. Rather, 
their position is that the lower courts failed to follow this Court’s decisions in this area 
and give a ‘firm application’ of the Federal Rules.”). 
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. 
 100.  Iqbal Transcript, supra note 83, at 36–37 (statement of Chief Justice 
Roberts) (“Well I thought, and others may know better in connection to Bell Atlantic, 
but I thought in Bell Atlantic what we said is that there’s a standard but it’s . . . 
affected by the context in which the allegations are made. That was a context of a 
particular type of antitrust violation and that affected how we would look at the 
complaint. And here . . . because we’re looking at litigation involving the Attorney 
General and the Director of the FBI in connection with their national security 
responsibilities . . . there ought to be greater rigor applied to our examination of the 
complaint.”); see id. at 43 (statement of Chief Justice Roberts) (“What you have to 
show is some facts, or at least what you have to allege are some facts, showing that 
they knew of a policy that was discriminatory based on ethnicity and country of 
origin.”). 
 101.  Bone, supra note 30, at 327 (“Reliance on case-specific discretion might 
be a sensible strategy if proceduralists today still believed, as the original Federal Rules 
drafters did, that procedural design is a technical exercise largely devoid of substantive 
BURBANK - FINAL 4/7/2009 10:23 AM 
558 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
For these reasons, if the Court feels that the purposes of the 
official-immunity defense require even greater protection than recently 
reinvigorated pleading jurisprudence provides, it should forthrightly 
require fact pleading as a matter of substantive law.102 Better yet, in 
light of a slow trickle of ever more troubling information about how the 
previous administration fought the war on terrorism—despite an 
approach to governmental secrecy that would have made former 
Romanian president Nicolae Ceauşescu proud103—the Court should 
affirm the Second Circuit and allow Iqbal to proceed to discovery, even 
if “limited and tightly controlled.”104 
Professor Miller correctly sees as part of the larger significance of 
Tellabs that some of the winnowing work formerly assigned to 
summary judgment is now assigned to the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.105 
 
value and best performed by trial judges. That belief, however, was thoroughly 
discredited in the 1970s. The normative issues are not purely technical; they directly 
implicate substantive values.”). 
 102. If the Court were to do so, any such requirement might be applicable in a 
state-court action involving the same defense of official immunity, a scenario that is 
probably only theoretically possible given the availability of removal. See supra text 
accompanying notes 93–94. Cf. Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (holding a 
strict Georgia pleading rule was inapplicable in a Federal Employer Liability Act case 
in Georgia state court). Unfortunately, Twombly has prompted the proliferation of 
nonsense about the circumstances when federal law displaces state law in state court 
under the pernicious rubric of “reverse” or “converse” Erie. See Z.W. Julius Chen, 
Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural 
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1443–53 (2008). Because the only sources of 
authority for such displacement are the federal constitutional and statutory bases of 
substantive federal (including common) law, the transsubstantive Federal Rules and 
cases interpreting them are irrelevant (except perhaps as a source of inspiration for a 
substance-specific rule of federal common law). See Burbank, supra note 93, at 1557–
58; Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 805–10 
(1986). 
 103. See Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 
902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Under Romanian 
law, anything that is not a ‘State secret’ is a ‘Service secret’—in other words, 
everything is secret.”). 
 104. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008). It is useful in this regard to recall the links 
between the Progressives’ project of regulatory “legibility” and the impulses that led to 
broad discovery under the Federal Rules. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 597–98 n.20 
(discussing Edson Sunderland, a Progressive who was the chief architect of the 
discovery rules); Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights 
and the New American State, in 16 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 61 
(2002). 
 105. See Miller, supra note 2, at 532 (“Tellabs is an interpretation of the 
standards governing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). But when one examines 
how that motion is actually adjudicated in securities fraud cases, it becomes evident that 
the hydraulic pressures of the PSLRA’s pleading rules have deformed the 12(b)(6) 
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In fact, Twombly is far more powerful evidence of that proposition 
because of its striking resemblance to Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp.,106 in which the Court was both similarly intent 
on policing inferences to protect the integrity of substantive antitrust 
law—but at the summary-judgment stage—and similarly ambiguous 
about the reach of the power to do so outside of that substantive 
context.107 Moreover, although Tellabs is conclusive proof, were it 
needed, that Congress has learned that procedure is power, at least 
Congress was well positioned institutionally to evaluate the social costs 
and benefits of setting a high bar for complaints filed without benefit of 
formal discovery, and its task in doing so was circumscribed by the 
social policies germane to the domain of substantive securities law. 
The Twombly Court, by contrast, was not well positioned 
institutionally to evaluate even the procedural costs and benefits of 
tightening the pleading screws on plaintiffs, even in the isolated 
substantive-law context involved in the case.108 The Court acting as 
 
motion and converted it into something different—a sort of hybrid between the motion 
to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.”). 
 106. See 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Burbank, supra note 23, at 623 (“The 
contradictions and studied ambiguity of two decisions in the trilogy, each of which was 
responsive to the perceived requirements of a particular substantive context and might 
well have been so confined but for the fetish of transsubstantive procedure, provide 
support for very different approaches to Rule 56.”). As Justice Stevens’s powerful 
dissent in Twombly points out, granting authority to police inferences at the pleading 
stage represents a major change, because it may lead to the termination of cases before 
plaintiffs have had any discovery at all. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 
1955, 1982 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 107. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1982. 
 108. On the theoretical and practical differences between making law by 
decision versus by Federal Rule, see generally Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra 
note 30, at 698–713; see also Burbank, supra note 27, at 1147–57, 1192–93; Burbank, 
supra note 94, at 1021. Judge Posner is correct that “[r]ight or wrong, the decision in 
Bell Atlantic was pragmatic rather than legalist.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK 54 (2008). Yet, there can be no doubt that consideration of a number of the 
policy questions presented by Twombly would have benefited from the fruits of 
empirical research, even if only research whose results had already been published. 
Consider in that regard the Court’s discussion of the costs of discovery, which, 
eschewing any reference to systematic as opposed to anecdotal data, relied to a great 
extent on an article by Judge Easterbrook that is heavy on theory and light on facts. See 
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 & n.6 (citing Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989)). Not only was that article’s analysis predicated on a 
law-and-economics model of so-called impositional discovery; it was published in 1989, 
before substantial changes to the discovery rules in 1993, 2000, and 2006—changes that 
the Twombly Court ignored. I am reminded of an observation I made about the Seventh 
Circuit’s attempt to turn Federal Rule 11 into a “fee-shifting statute”: “Theory is an 
irresponsible basis for lawmaking about something as important as access to court, and 
it is especially irresponsible when the lawmaking involves judicial amendment of a Rule 
. . . .” Burbank, Transformation, supra note 30, at 1947–48. 
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such under Article III was even less well positioned to estimate the 
procedural costs and benefits of a general rule of plausible pleading (if 
that is what Twombly gives us), let alone the nonprocedural costs and 
benefits of such a rule, substance specific or general.109 Yet, the Article 
III process may have been all that the Court thought was available since 
the justices likely knew through the chief justice that changing pleading 
requirements through the Enabling Act Process had been considered 
and abandoned as political dynamite on more than one occasion, 
including in the recent past.110 
CONCLUSION 
Twombly ’s most obvious and immediate consequence has been 
enormous confusion and transaction costs as a result of uncertainty 
about the requirements it imposes and its scope of application. Apart 
from those costs, and whether or not Twombly was an exercise in 
strategic ambiguity, it is an invitation to the lower federal courts to 
screen out complaints in disfavored classes of cases, whether they are 
disfavored because of their perceived discovery burdens or for some 
other reason. I am reminded of observations I made about experience 
under the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule 11. Having suggested that 
those amendments “signall[ed] a more candid recognition that different 
cases may have different requirements,” I raised the question “whether 
and when the only or the best answer to that perception lies in reliance 
on the discretion of judges, guided by general directions that usually are 
not informed by empirical study, to deliver on the promise of equal 
justice.”111 
 
 There can similarly be no doubt that, quite apart from systematic empirical 
research, consideration of many of the policy questions implicated in Twombly would 
have benefited from a base of experience with first-instance litigation broader than that 
possessed by the members of the Supreme Court, almost all of which predates Justice 
Stevens’s appointment in 1975. 
 109. Bone, supra note 85, at 86 (“Whatever screening approach is adopted, 
however, two general points should guide its design. First, the project should be 
handled by formal rulemaking or the legislative process, not by the common law 
method of case-by-case interpretation of the Federal Rules. Because it requires a 
controversial choice of normative metric and a coordinated analysis of different rule 
options, this project is most suitable for a process open to public input, able to generate 
and properly consider relevant empirical information, and capable of addressing the 
issues from a global and systemic perspective. Second, because the screening approach 
should be tailored to the types of cases that involve meritless filings most seriously, any 
set of rules should be substance-specific.”). 
 110. See Editorial, supra note 88. 
 111. Burbank, Transformation, supra note 30, at 1936–37. 
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Perhaps the most troublesome possible consequence of Twombly is 
that it will deny court access to those who, although they have 
meritorious claims, cannot satisfy its requirements either because they 
lack the resources to engage in extensive prefiling investigation or 
because of informational asymmetries. As Judge Richard Nygaard 
stated in Phillips v. Allegheny,112 “Few issues in civil procedure 
jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which are 
the key that opens access to courts.”113 More generally, Twombly is but 
the most recent signal of a retreat from the goal of adjudication on the 
merits, a retreat that has already seen the trial-termination rate decline 
precipitously, to the point that it is a quarter or less of the termination 
rate by summary judgment.114 
Ultimately, of course, Twombly raises the question whether our 
society remains committed to private litigation as a means of securing 
compensation for injury and enforcing important social norms. From 
that perspective, another important policy issue it raises is whether, if 
we retreated from that commitment, we would provide alternatives such 
as social insurance and administrative enforcement.115 In addressing that 
question, decision makers presumably would benefit from information 
about experience in other countries that did not previously share our 
commitment to private litigation, that have provided alternatives, but 
that are now rethinking the best way to achieve their societal goals. It is 
interesting, if not ironic, that a number of such countries have decided, 
among other reforms, to relax bans on contingent-fee litigation and to 
experiment with group and other forms of aggregate litigation.116 In any 
event, from this perspective, it is again apparent that the policy 
questions are not the sort that should be answered by nine judges in the 
exercise of Article III judicial power, with little information, less 
experience, and no power to implement nonlitigation alternatives. 
Even if the Court finds a way to decide Iqbal without engendering 
additional confusion and damage to the policies of access to court, 
compensation for injury, and norm enforcement—and unless it issues a 
 
 112. 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 113.  Id. at 230. 
 114. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 616–18.  
 115.  See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). 
 116. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, 
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 705, 710–11 (2002) (describing the United Kingdom’s change of 
position regarding “litigation on spec,” as a direct result of cuts in the legal aid 
budget).  
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palinode117 retracting all but the narrow holding in Twombly 118—the 
latter decision should remain cause for serious concern. We see in it 
some of the costs of the foundational assumptions and operating 
principles of modern American procedure. 
Now that even Congress has learned how to use procedure, openly 
or not, to advance substantive goals, greater attention naturally focuses 
on choices made by those responsible for crafting and interpreting 
procedural rules, wherever they sit. Yet, the foundational assumption 
that the Enabling Act requires transsubstantive rules is thought to 
prevent use of its process when a particular substantive context requires 
a different procedural rule, while the judiciary’s refusal to acknowledge 
that statutory procedure is legitimate prevents it from taking the 
initiative in seeking a legislative fix.119 As a result, courts struggle to 
make a substance-specific solution fit within the general rule or to 
change the general rule without admitting that they are doing so. The 
tendency of the first tactic is to yield a nonoptimal solution for the 
particular substantive context. The tendency of the second is to yield a 
nonoptimal solution for all substantive contexts. 
More generally, Twombly provides additional evidence of the 
costs of complexity in modern American procedure.120 We know that 
elites have had, and still have today, enormous influence in determining 
the content of law, and that legal elites have had, and still have today, 
enormous influence in determining the content of that special form of 
prospective law that we call the Federal Rules. By reason of 
foundational assumptions and operating principles, the rules they secure 
for the high-stakes, complex cases that are their special concern become 
 
 117. This word denotes a poem in which the poet retracts something said in a 
previous poem or, more generally, any formal retraction. See AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 944 (3d ed. 1973). Its allure in, and aptness 
given, our recent political circumstances should be apparent. 
 118. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1963 (2007) (“We 
granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy 
through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”). 
 119. Note the recent exception in amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 
502, proposed as legislation by the judiciary and enacted by Congress. See Pub. L. No. 
110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008); S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 4 (2008), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid
=f:sr264.110.pdf (“On December 11, 2007, Chairman Leahy introduced S. 2450, 
incorporating the language proposed by the Judicial Conference’s Advisory 
Committee.”). Because, however, the amendments govern attorney-client privilege, the 
judiciary had no choice by reason of the Enabling Act’s requirement that any “rule 
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect 
unless approved by Act of Congress.” 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006). 
 120. See Burbank, supra note 41; Burbank, supra note 67. 
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the rules for all litigation in federal court.121 The Cadillac process they 
enshrine helps to drive out of federal court those who can afford only a 
Ford.122 Moreover, to the extent states continue to use the Federal 
Rules as a model for their courts,123 the result may be to make courts in 
general unavailable for the resolution of everyday disputes. 
The Federal Rules necessarily confer substantial discretion on 
Article III judges. The discretion they confer entails the power to make 
policy choices that, although they may be buried in the obscurity of 
technical language, are increasingly likely to be exposed by those who 
have come to recognize the power of procedure, often in recent years 
aided by systematic empirical data.124 Growing awareness that questions 
of “mere procedure” may implicate important social policy encourages 
those who cannot make an independent judgment to have only so much 
confidence in the integrity of the process and the quality of the legal 
products it produces as they do in the actors who control it. In an age 
when politicians, interest groups, and the media find it convenient to 
 
 121. See Burbank, supra note 116, at 711 (“The misguided approach to 
procedural reform that treats all litigation as if it were complex litigation can at least be 
explained, if not justified, by the quest for uniform and transsubstantive regulation that 
has preoccupied American procedural policy.”). 
 122. See JOSEPH, supra note 41; Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Rules After 
Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 249 (1984). I am here taking a point made by 
Professor Hadfield one step further, or perhaps one step back. She has argued that 
through a market allocation of lawyers that favors corporate clients over individual 
clients, the legal system establishes that governing the economy is the principal role of 
the justice system. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for 
Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1000 (2000). My point is 
that, in addition to favoring jurisdictional rules that have privileged business throughout 
most of our history, see supra text accompanying notes 41–42, the federal judiciary has 
created a procedural system so complex that most litigants who can satisfy federal 
jurisdictional requirements cannot afford to litigate in federal court. 
 123. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 
NEV. L.J. 354 (2002) (updating a 1986 study of the extent of state adoption of the 
Federal Rules). The borrowing is especially problematic to the extent that state-court 
judges are under greater docket and resource pressures than their federal colleagues, 
depriving them of the ability to use the tools in the Federal Rules for managing 
litigation. 
 124. See Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of 
Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 
B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 342, 344 (2002) (“For, when one knows that a rule has a statistically 
significant differential impact on a class of litigants or in a particular type of case, the 
veil is lifted, the myth of neutrality as to litigant power is exploded, and the question of 
lawmaking power to address the situation is unavoidable. It may not be a coincidence, 
therefore, that the heightened attention to questions of rulemaking power in the past ten 
years has come during a period of unprecedented attention to empirical investigation of 
the real-world effects of rules by the rule makers.”); supra note 33 (discussing the 
inappropriateness of a “veil of ignorance” as a normative posture for rule makers). 
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represent that courts are part not only of the political process, but of 
ordinary politics, and that judges should be viewed as the policy agents 




 125. See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, 
and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 910 (2007) (discussing attacks on courts 
that implement strategies reflecting a theory of judicial agency and that are designed “to 
create and sustain an impression of judges that makes courts fodder for electoral 
politics”). 
